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Abstract
This article discusses how externally focused ?industry platforms? affect innovation. First, we define the term ?platform?
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differences in the types of platforms and associated economic and strategic concepts. Third, we review the case of Intel
and other examples to illustrate the range of technological, strategic, and business challenges that platform leaders and
their competitors face as markets and technologies evolve. Finally, we identify practices associated with effective
platform leadership and avenues for future research to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon. 
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 This article discusses how externally focused “industry platforms” affect innovation. 
First, we define the term “platform” and discuss why this concept is important. Second, we 
provide an overview of the relevant literature in order to clarify differences in the types of 
platforms and associated economic and strategic concepts. Third, we review the case of Intel 
and other examples to illustrate the range of technological, strategic, and business challenges 
that platform leaders and their competitors face as markets and technologies evolve. Finally, 
we identify practices associated with effective platform leadership and avenues for future 
research to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon.  
 
Platform Definitions and Distinctions 
 What managers and researchers refer to as “platforms” exist in a variety of industries, 
especially in high-tech businesses driven by information technology. Microsoft, Apple, 
Google, Intel, Cisco, ARM, Qualcomm, EMC, and hundreds if not thousands of other firms, 
small and large, build hardware and software products as well as applications, and provide a 
variety of services, for computers, cell phones, and consumer electronics devices that in one 
form or another serve as industry platforms. All these firms and their partners participate in 
what we can call platform-based “ecosystem” innovation (Moore, 1996; Iansiti and Levien, 
2004). Platforms are also often associated with “network effects”:  that is, the more users who 
adopt the platform, the more valuable the platform becomes to the owner and to the users 
because of growing access to the network of users and often a set of complementary 
innovations.  As we will discuss later, moreover, there are increasing incentives for more 
firms and users to adopt the platform and join the ecosystem as more users and 
complementors join.1
Industry platforms and associated innovations, as well as platforms on top of or 
embedded within other platforms (such as microprocessors embedded within personal 
computers or smart phones that access the Internet, on top of which search engines such as 
Google and social media networks such as Facebook exist, and on top of which applications 
operate, etc.) have become increasingly pervasive in our everyday lives.  Not surprisingly, 
several distinct academic literatures have studied this phenomenon. The term platform has 
become nearly ubiquitous, appearing in the new product development and operations 
  
                                                 
1
 We use the term “complementor” in the sense defined by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), as a short-hand 
for “the developer of a complementary product” where two products are complements if greater sales of one 
increase demand for the other.  Formally, A and B are complements if the valuation by consumers of A and B 
together is greater than the sum of the valuation of A alone and of B alone.  Va+b = (1 + į) (Va + Vb),   į > 0. 
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management field (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997; Cusumano and Nobeoka, 1998; Simpson et al., 
2005); in technology strategy (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002 and 2008, Eisenmann, Parker and 
Van Alstyne, 2006); and in industrial economics (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Evans, 2003; 
Armstrong, 2006). But our analysis of a wide range of industry examples suggests that there 
are two predominant forms of platforms: internal or company-specific platforms, and external 
or industry-wide platforms. 
In this paper, we define internal (company or product) platforms as a set of assets 
organized in a common structure from which a company can efficiently develop and produce 
a stream of derivative products (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997; Muffato and Roveda, 2002). We 
define external (industry) platforms as products, services or technologies that are similar to 
the former but provide the foundation upon which outside firms (organized as a ‘business 
ecosystem’) can develop their own complementary products, technologies, or services (Gawer 
and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer, 2009a). These are high-level definitions, and it is instructive to 
see how researchers have treated the distinctions between these two types of platforms at a 
more detailed level. 
 
Research on Internal and External Platforms2
 Internal Platforms 
 
 The first popular usage of the term platform seems to have been in the context of new 
product development and incremental innovation around reusable components or technologies. 
We refer to these as internal platforms in that a firm, either working by itself or with suppliers, 
can build a family of related products or sets of new features by deploying these components. 
Wheelwright and Clark (1992), for example, describe how “product platforms” can meet the 
needs of different customers simply by modifying, adding, or subtracting different features. 
McGrath (1995),  Meyer and Lehnerd (1997), Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998), Krishman and 
Gupta (2001), and Muffatto and Roveda, (2002) all define platforms as a set of subsystems 
and interfaces that form a common structure from which a company can efficiently develop 
and produce a family of automobile products or consumer electronics devices. Robertson and 
Ulrich (1998) propose an even broader definition, viewing platforms as the collection of 
assets (i.e., components, processes, knowledge, people and relationships) that a set of 
products share. In the marketing literature, Sawhney (1998) even suggests that managers 
                                                 
2
 This section follows Gawer (2009a) [“Platform Dynamics and Strategies: from Products to Services”].  
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should move from “portfolio thinking” to “platform thinking,” which he defines as  
understanding the common strands that tie the firm’s offerings, markets, and processes 
together, and exploit these commonalities to create leveraged growth and variety.  
 These literatures have identified, with a large degree of consensus, several potential 
benefits of internal platforms: savings in fixed costs; efficiency gains in product development 
through the reuse of common parts and “modular” designs, in particular, the ability to produce 
a large number of derivative products with limited resources; and flexibility in product feature 
design. One key objective of platform-based new product development seems to be the ability 
to increase product variety and meet diverse customer requirements, business needs, and 
technical advancements while maintaining economies of scale and scope within 
manufacturing processes – an approach also associated with “mass customisation” (Pine, 
1993).  
 The empirical evidence indicates that, in practice, companies have successfully used 
product platforms to control high production and inventory costs, as well as reduce time to 
market. Most of the early research is about durable goods, whose production processes 
involve manufacturing, such as in the automotive, aircraft, equipment manufacturing, and 
consumer electronics sectors. Companies frequently associated with module-based product 
development and families of products derived from common internal platforms include Sony, 
Hewlett-Packard, NDC (Nippon Denso), Boeing, Honda, Rolls Royce, and Black & Decker 
(Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1997; Feitzinger and Lee, 1997; Whitney, 1993; Lehnerd, 1987; 
Rothwell and Gardiner, 1990; Sabbagh, 1996;  Reichtin and Kranz, 2003; Simpson et al., 
2005).  
 Researchers have also identified a few fundamental design principles or ‘design rules’ 
that appear to operate in internal product platforms, in particular the stability of the system 
architecture, and the systematic or planned reuse of modular components (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Baldwin and Woodward, 2009).  We can see as well a fundamental trade-off couched in 
terms of functionality and performance: the optimization of any particular subsystem may 
result in the sub-optimization of the overall system (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997). In this sense, 
internal platforms may promote only incremental innovation or constrain some types of 
innovation – a theme that we will return to later in this article.  
 We should also mention the concept of a “supply-chain platform,” although we see 
this as a special case of internal platform,  Here, a set of firms follow specific guidelines to 
supply intermediate products or components to the platform leader or the final product 
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assembler. The objective of these platforms is also to improve efficiency and reduce cost such 
as by the systematic reuse of modular components.  Major potential benefits are that a firm 
with access to a platform supply chain can tap into external capabilities to find more 
innovative or less expensive components and technologies.  At the same time, a firm may 
have less control over the components and technology, which can have its own negative 
consequences.  Supply chain platforms are common in assembly industries, such as consumer 
electronics, computers, and automobiles (Tierney et al., 2000; Bremner et al., 2004; Szczesny, 
2003; Sako, 2003, 2009; Zirpoli and Becker, 2008; Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002; Brusoni, 2005; 
Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006). We can also link this literature to other research on sharing 
modules across firms (Staudenmayer, Tripsas and Tucci, 2005), limits of modularity as a 
design strategy (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001), and industry architecture or structure (Jacobides, 
Knudsen and Augier, 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007).  But the research suggests that a key 
distinction between supply chains and industry platforms is that, in the case of industry 
platforms, the firms developing the complementary innovations – such as applications for 
Windows or the Apple App Store – do not necessarily buy from or sell to each other.  Nor are 
they usually part of the same supply chain or share patterns of cross-ownership, such as 
Toyota does with its major component suppliers. 
 
 External Platforms 
 We have defined external or industry platforms, the main subject of this paper, as 
products, services or technologies developed by one or more firms, and which serve as 
foundations upon which a larger number of firms can build further complementary 
innovations, in the form of specific products, related services or component technologies. 
There is a similarity to internal platforms in that industry platforms provide a foundation of 
common components or technologies, but they differ in that this foundation is “open” to 
outside firms. The degree of openness can vary on a number of dimensions – such as level of 
access to information on interfaces to link to the platform or utilize its capabilities, the type of 
rules governing use of the platform, or cost of access (as in patent or licensing fees). In 
general, despite different degrees of openness, various products and technologies serve as 
industry platforms: the Microsoft Windows and Linux operating systems; Intel and ARM 
microprocessors; Apple’s iPod, iPhone, and iPad along with the iOS operating system and 
iTunes and the Apple App Store; Google’s Internet search engine and Android operating 
system for smart phones, social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter; 
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video-game consoles; and even the Internet itself.  We can even view payment technologies, 
ranging from credit and debit cards to micropayment schemes, as platforms that enable 
financial transactions.  
 Early research on industry platforms and their innovation ecosystems generally focused 
on computing, telecommunications, and other information-technology intensive industries. 
For example, Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999), in their study of the computer industry, 
analyzed platforms as a bundle of standard components around which buyers and sellers 
coordinated their efforts. West (2003) defined a computer platform as an architecture of 
related standards that allowed modular substitution of complementary assets such as software 
and peripheral hardware. Iansiti and Levin (2004) called a ‘keystone firm’ the equivalent of 
what Gawer and Cusumano (2002, 2008) referred to as a platform leader, that is a firm that 
drives industrywide innovation for an evolving system of separately developed components. 
Gawer and Henderson (2007) described a product as a platform when it is one component or 
subsystem of an evolving technological system, when it is strongly functionally 
interdependent with most of the other components of this system, and when end-user demand 
is for the overall system, so that there is no demand for components when they are isolated 
from the overall system. 
 Taken together, these studies suggest several generalizations with regard to how 
industry platforms affect competitive dynamics as well as innovation at the ecosystem level. 
Positions of industrial leadership are often contested and lost when industry platforms emerge, 
as the balance of power between assemblers and component-makers changes. And, at the 
same time, industry platforms tend to facilitate and increase the degree of innovation on 
complementary products and services. The more innovation there is on complements, the 
more value it creates for the platform and its users via network effects, creating a cumulative 
advantage for existing platforms: As they grow, they become harder to dislodge by rivals or 
new entrants, the growing number of complements acting like a barrier to entry. The rise of 
industry platforms raises complex social welfare questions regarding the trade-offs between 
the social benefits of platform-compatible innovation, versus the potentially negative effects 
of preventing competition on overall systems. 
 The design principles or “design rules” of industry platforms also overlap somewhat 
with those for internal and supply-chain platforms. In particular, the stability of the platform 
architecture is still essential. However, there are important differences. In contrast to what 
happens for internal and supply-chain platforms, in industry platforms, the logic of design is 
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inverted. Instead of a firm being a “master designer” or assembler, here, we start with a core 
component that is part of an encompassing modular structure, and the final result of the 
assembly is either unknown ex ante, or incomplete. In fact, in industry platforms, the end-use 
of the end-product or service is not fully pre-determined. This creates unprecedented scope 
for innovation on complementary products, services and technologies. The situation 
simultaneously evokes the fundamental question of how incentives (for third-parties) to 
innovate can be embedded in the design of the platform. This leads to another design rule for 
industry platforms: The interfaces around the platform must be sufficiently “open” to allow 
outside firms to “plug in” complements as well as innovate on these complements and make 
money from their investments. This resonates well with research by Chesbrough (2003) and 
others (von Hippel, 2005) on open innovation. However, recent research on platforms, by 
highlighting the complex trade-offs between “open” and “closed” (Eisenmann, Parker and 
Van Alstyne, 2009; Greenstein, 2009; Schilling, 2009; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008), suggest 
that while opening up interfaces will increase complementors’ incentives to innovate, it is 
important to preserve as proprietary some source of revenue and profit. It therefore adds a 
more subtle take on the literature on open innovation that had extolled the benefits of opening 
interfaces. 
 There are also specific strategic questions that arise in the context of industry platforms. 
For example, Gawer and Cusumano (2008) argue that not all products, services or 
technologies can become industry platforms. To perform this industry-wide role and convince 
other firms to adopt the platform as their own, the platform must (1) perform a function that is 
essential to a broader technological system, and (2) solve a business problem for many firms 
and users in the industry. While necessary, these conditions alone are not sufficient to help 
firms transform their products, technologies or services into industry platforms, nor indicate 
how platform leaders can stimulate complementary innovations by other firms, including 
some competitors, while simultaneously taking advantage of owning the platform. 
 One particular challenge for innovation dynamics is that platform leaders and 
competitors must navigate a complex strategic landscape where both competition and 
collaboration occur, sometimes among the same actors. For example, as a technology evolves, 
platform owners often face the opportunity to extend the scope of their platform and integrate 
into complementary markets. This creates disincentives for complementors to invest in 
innovation in these complementary markets. For example, Farrell and Katz (2000) identified 
the difficulty for platform owners to commit not to squeeze the profit margins of their 
7 
 
complementors. Gawer and Henderson (2007) show how Intel’s careful selection of which 
complementary markets to enter (the connectors) while giving away corresponding 
intellectual property allowed the firm to push forward the platform/applications interface, 
thereby retaining control of the architecture, while renewing incentives for complementors to 
innovate “on top of” the newly extended platform. Another challenge is that, as technology is 
constantly evolving, the business decisions and the technology or design decisions have to be 
taken in a coherent manner. This is difficult to achieve since these decisions are often made 
by different teams within the organization. Hence, to make the whole greater than the sum of 
the parts, as in Gawer and Cusumano (2002), we can see the need in many complex systems 
industries for one firm or a small group of firms to act as a “platform leader”. 
 
Network Effects and Multi-Sided Markets 
 But perhaps the most critical distinguishing feature of an industry platform compared to 
an internal company platform or supply chain is the potential creation of network effects. As 
mentioned earlier, these are positive feedback loops that can grow at exponentially increasing 
rates as adoption of the platform and the complements rise. The network effects can be very 
powerful, especially when they are “direct” (sometimes called “same-side”) between the 
platform and the user of the complementary innovation and reinforced by a technical 
compatibility or interface standard that makes using multiple platforms (“multi-homing”) 
difficult or costly. For example, Windows applications or Apple iPhone applications only 
work on compatible devices. Or Facebook users can only view profiles of friends and family 
within their groups. The network effects can also be “indirect” or “cross-side,” and sometimes 
these are very powerful as well.  These occur when, for example, advertisers become attracted 
to the Google search engine because of the large number of users.  Companies can also 
innovate in business models and find ways of charging different sides of the market to make 
money from their platform or from complements and different kinds of transactions or 
advertising (Eisenmann, Parker and Van Alstyne, 2006). 
 There may be some limits to these effects, however.  Boudreau (forthcoming), in a 
study of ecosystems for mobile computing and communications platforms, has found that, 
while there is a positive feedback loop to the number of complementors, this positive impact 
does not perpetuate itself ad infinitum. Too many complementors at some point seem to 
discourage additional firms from making the investment to join the ecosystem. 
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 In parallel with the strategy literature, some researchers in industrial organization 
economics have begun using the term platform to denote markets with two or more sides, and 
potentially with network effects that cross different sides. Such a “multi-sided market” 
provides goods or services to several distinct groups of customers, all of whom need each 
other in some way and rely on the platform to mediate their transactions (Evans, 2003; Rochet 
and Tirole, 2003 and 2006). While the concept of a multi-sided market can sometimes apply 
to supply-chain platforms as well as industry platforms, it does not entirely conform to either 
category. But there are important similarities between industry platforms and multi-sided 
markets. Among the similarities are the existence of indirect network effects that arise 
between two different sides of a market when customer groups must be affiliated with the 
platform in order to be able to interact or transact with one another (Armstrong, 2006; 
Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans, 2003, Hagiu, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2003 and 2006). At 
the same time, though, not all multi-sided markets are industry platforms as we describe them 
in this paper. Double-sided markets where the role of the platform is purely to facilitate 
exchange or trade, without the possibility for other players to innovate on complementary 
markets, seem to belong to the supply-chain category. A multi-sided market that stimulates 
external innovation could be regarded as an industry platform. However, while all industry 
platforms function in this way, not all multi-sided markets do.  For example, dating bars and 
web sites, a common example used in the literature, can certainly be seen as double-sided 
markets since they facilitate transactions between two distinct groups of customers. But there 
need not be a market for complementary innovations facilitated by the existence of the 
platform. 
 
 The emerging literature on double-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003 and 2006; 
Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans, 2003) helps us understand the “chicken-
and-egg problem” of how to encourage access to a platform for distinct groups of buyers or 
sellers.  But, the literature also has some significant limitations from the perspective of 
platform research. For example, it takes for granted the existence of the markets that transact 
through the platform. With the notable exceptions of Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) and 
Hagiu (2007a and 2007b), this literature has delivered only limited insight into why such 
platforms come into existence in the first place: the drivers of platform emergence and 
evolution. Most papers focus on pricing as the key to encouraging access and adoption. In a 
welcome development, however, Evans (2009) focuses on start-up platform strategies, while 
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Hagiu (2007b), Eisenmann et al. (2009), and Boudreau and Hagiu (2009) focus on the 
importance of non-price mechanisms for the governance of platform ecosystems. They 
suggest, in accordance with Gawer and Cusumano (2002), that pricing alone cannot be the 
answer to the inevitable strategic questions of platform dynamics, such as how to share risks 
among members of an ecosystem. These papers take the double-sided (or multi-sided) 
literature to the next level and bridge the strategy and product design literature as well as the 
industrial organization economics literature. 
 
Platform Leadership and the Case of Intel 
Platform leaders find themselves in both a laudable and difficult strategic situation:  They 
are central players in an ecosystem but highly dependent on innovations and investments from 
other firms. Far from remaining passively impacted by the decisions of others, however, the 
evidence suggests that platform leaders have a variety of strategic alternatives they can use to 
influence the direction of innovation in complementary products by third parties. Platform 
leaders, therefore, are organizations that manage to successfully establish their product, 
service, or technology, as an industry platform and rise to a position where they can influence 
the trajectory of the overall technological and business system of which the platform is a core 
element. When done properly, these firms can also derive an architectural advantage from 
their relatively central positions.  
At the same time, platform leaders generally want to maintain or increase competition 
among complementors, thereby maintaining their bargaining power over complementors. 
Platform leadership is therefore always accompanied by some degree of architectural control 
(Schilling, 2009) as well as interdependence. The momentum created by the network effects 
between the platform and its complementary products or services, can often erect a barrier to 
entry for potential platform competitors.  
It follows that establishing an industry platform requires more than technical efforts and 
astute decisions about design and architecture to facilitate complementary innovations. 
Platform leaders must also strive to establish a set of business relationships that are mutually 
beneficial for ecosystem participants and be able to articulate a set of mutually enhancing 
business models.3
                                                 
3
 While platform leaders will often claim that establishing trust between themselves and complementors is 
essential to their success, recent research (Perrons, 2009) explores in detail the issue of trust in platform 
leadership and attempts to separate empirically whether the alignment platform leaders obtain from 
complementors is due to coercion or due to trust. 
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Gawer and Cusumano (2002, 2008) have studied several examples of industry platforms 
and the behaviour of leading companies in those markets. In particular, based on their study of 
Intel, with comparisons to Microsoft, Cisco, Palm, and NTT DoCoMo, they developed the 
concept of “platform leadership,” along with its associated strategic activities and practices. 
Their 2002 study in particular describes in detail the key actions Intel took to rise from a 
simple component maker to supplier within a system architecture that it had not designed, and 
then to transform itself into a major source of influence over the evolution of the personal 
computer.  
Beginning in the early 1980s, Intel (founded in 1968) has contributed an essential 
hardware component, the microprocessor, to personal computers, while Microsoft has 
contributed an essential software component, the operating system, as well as some key 
applications products such as Office. The PC market grew rapidly during the 1980s and 
industry leadership shifted from Apple (founded in 1976) to IBM and then to Intel and 
Microsoft (founded in 1975).  But Intel executives, in the early 1990s, began to believe that it 
would be increasingly difficult to continue growing demand for PCs for at least two reasons:  
First was an increasingly obsolete PC architecture, which made it difficult to handle new 
graphical applications or communications functions (remote database access as well as fax 
and telephony, video conferencing, etc.). Second was the lack of technical leadership to 
advance the PC “system” – basic hardware and software as well as new applications and 
connections to peripherals such as printers, cameras, fax machines, scanners, and the like. It is 
well-known that, when Intel first developed microprocessors for personal computers, it was 
not the architect of the overall system. Intel entered the market merely as a component 
supplier to IBM, whose engineers had designed the overall platform. But the aging IBM PC 
architecture was becoming a problem for Intel in that the system architecture and limitations 
on available basic software and applications prevented its chips from reaching their maximum 
performance levels, especially compared to advances in the Macintosh computer (introduced 
in 1984) and various high-performance work stations using RISC (reduced instruction-set 
computing) architectures .  
The problem was serious for Intel because what had become its primary business – 
designing and manufacturing microprocessors for personal computers — was an enormous 
growth opportunity that requires billions of dollars in investment for each microprocessor 
generation.  Yet the systemic nature of the PC meant that the success of the platform involved 
many actors that Intel did not control. Many companies (in particular, all the suppliers for this 
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architecture) had a stake in the PC design. No single supplier of software or other components 
(chip sets, screens, keyboards, printers, operating systems or applications) could evolve the 
overall system by itself, let alone change it significantly.   
Therefore, the first problem that Intel faced was that the architecture of the system was 
becoming obsolete or was less advanced and much more difficult to use than competing 
computer systems. The second problem was that there did not seem to emerge a leader 
capable of moving the platform technology forward in a way that was either satisfactory for 
users or for Intel. Intel executives, led by co-founder and Chairman Gordon Moore, and CEO 
Andy Grove, were also thinking ahead, to the trajectory of innovation in which they were 
planning to invest. They intended to develop and commercialise a whole stream of ever more 
powerful microprocessors frequently and regularly in subsequent years (this investment 
pattern, where microprocessor power increased on a predictable basis while prices fell came 
to be known as “Moore’s Law”). A solution to the problem of the PC architecture, therefore, 
from Intel’s perspective, had to accommodate management’s future vision for the company. 
In 1991, Intel executives established a laboratory within the company to address these 
fundamental technical and strategic challenges. This group would be called the Intel 
Architecture Lab – or IAL. Grove initiated the creation of IAL by asking Dr. Craig Kinnie, 
who had had already been involved in previous system-design effort within Intel, to tackle 
the problem that the PC platform was not moving ahead as fast as Intel would like. Kinnie 
went on to head the IAL for the next ten years and came to champion IAL’s vision – both 
inside and outside Intel. 
Grove wanted the Intel Architecture Lab to become the “architect of the open computer 
industry.” 4   Kinnie recalled how “Dr. Grove concluded that … we needed to provide 
leadership to the industry to cause the platform to evolve more quickly, to get new 
applications and new uses for the platform… Andy Grove essentially asked me — his specific 
words — to become the architect for the open computer industry, to help the industry figure 
out how to evolve the platform. A narrow view of that would be to pretend that I was in a 
large company like IBM and that all these other companies worked for me and my boss, and 
that we could work together.”5
                                                 
4
 Author interview with Dr. Craig Kinnie, Director, Intel Architecture Lab, Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, Oregon, 
USA, 11 November 1997. 
  
5
 Author interview with Dr. Craig Kinnie, op. cit. 
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During the mid-1990s, IAL’s mission evolved so that IAL became “a catalyst for 
innovation in the industry.”6 Specifically, IAL became proactive in helping Intel with what 
company people called “Job 1” – selling more microprocessors, which were Intel’s main 
revenue and profit generators. By driving or “orchestrating” innovation activities at other 
firms that complemented Intel microprocessors, IAL engineers tried to create new uses for 
computing devices and thus help generate demand for new computers – most of which would 
probably use Intel microprocessors.7 By 1997, IAL’s mission had become even broader: “to 
establish the technologies, standards and products necessary to grow demand for the extended 
PC through the creation of new computing experiences.”8
 
 Accordingly, IAL became actively 
involved in driving architectural progress on the PC system, but also in stimulating and 
facilitating innovation on complementary products, and finally coordinating many firms’ 
innovative work in the industry, attempting to push forward the development of new system 
capabilities. Table 1 is a list of representative IAL activities during 1997-1998 aimed at 
orchestrating industry-level innovation as well as developing open system interfaces to 
stimulate complementary products and services from third parties. Table A in the Appendix 
provides further details on the industry initiatives aimed at coordinating industry innovation. 
Table 1: A list of Intel’s platform leadership activities (1997-1998) 
 
Projects Type of Project Did Intel share 
Intellectual 
Property for 
low royalties? 
 
Did Intel engage 
in cross-industry 
coordination, or 
in other forms of 
facilitation of 
complementors’ 
innovation? 
1 Networked Multimedia  Industry initiative N first/Y later Y 
2 Manageability  Industry initiative Y Y 
3 Big Pipes (Broadband) Industry initiative Y Y 
4 Security  Industry initiative Y Y 
5 Anywhere-in-the-Home  Industry initiative Y Y 
6 Advance-the-Platform Industry initiative Y Y 
7 PCI (Peripheral Component 
Interface) 
System interface Y Y 
8 AGP (Advanced Graphics System interface Y Y  
                                                 
6
 Author interview with Dave Johnson, Director of the Media and Interconnect Technology Lab, Intel 
Architecture Lab, Intel Corporation, Hillsboro, Oregon, USA, 20 August 1998. 
7
 Author interview with Carol Barrett, Marketing Manager, Intel Architecture Lab, Hillsboro, Oregon, USA, 5 
August 1998. Also, “Intel Architecture Labs, Overview,” undated Intel internal document. 
8
 Intel internal document, “Intel Architecture Lab: Overview” (1998). 
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Port) 
9 USB (Universal Serial Bus) System interface Y Y  
10 1394 (also called FireWire) System interface Y Y  
11 TAPI (Telephony 
Application Programming 
Interface)  
System interface Y Y 
12 H.323 (Computer telephony 
interface) 
System interface Y N first/Y later 
13 Home Radio-Frequency System interface Y Y 
14 DVD (Digital Video Disk) System interface Y Y 
15 CDSA (Security) System interface Y Y 
16 Indeo (Intel Video) System interface N first/Y later N first/Y later 
 
Source: adapted from Gawer (2000) and Gawer and Henderson (2007) 
  
The Intel study and comparisons to other firms suggests that companies which aim to 
establish their products, technologies, or services as platforms should attempt to orchestrate 
third-party industry innovation on complements in the context of a coherent set of strategic 
moves. Gawer and Cusumano described these strategic options as the “four levers” of 
platform leadership: (1) firm scope (which, if any, complements to make in-house); (2) 
technology design (degree of modularity in the platform) and intellectual property strategy 
(for example, free and open access to platform interfaces or services versus not free and 
closed); (3) external relations with complementors (such as initiatives to promote investments 
in complementary innovations); and (4) internal organization (company structures and 
processes that help manage conflicts should they arise, such as when the platform leader 
makes complements that compete directly with ecosystem partners).  
 We can see successful platform leaders both encouraging and constraining innovation. 
Intel did separate internal product or R&D groups that might have conflicting interests among 
themselves or clash with third-party complementors, such as chipset and motherboard 
producers. The latter relied on Intel’s advance cooperation to make sure their products were 
compatible. When Intel decided that these chipset and motherboard producers were not 
making new versions of their products fast enough to help sell new versions of 
microprocessors, Intel started making some of these intermediate products itself – to stimulate 
the end-user market. But it still kept its laboratories in a neutral position to work with 
ecosystem partners.  This was crucial to establish and maintain Intel’s reputation as a 
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trustworthy partner in the ecosystem, itself a difficult task because of strong short-term 
incentives to take advantage of innovation developed by less dominant complementors.9
 
  
Platform Leadership and the Innovator’s Dilemma 
 Platforms supported by a global ecosystem of complementors and strong network 
effects should be more difficult for competitors to dislodge than standalone products that are 
more subject to competition based on fashion or price.  But even the best firms face a 
potential challenge similar to that described by Clay Christensen in The Innovator’s Dilemma 
(1997):  Success ties a firm to its existing customers as well as products and business models 
associated with those customers. This makes it difficult for a firm to change its products or its 
platform, even though these probably need to evolve lest they become obsolete. A number of 
well-known platform leaders have experienced this type of innovator’s dilemma.  
 
IBM versus Intel and Microsoft 
 IBM created the first global platform in the modern computer era, based on the IBM 
System 360 mainframe software and family of compatible computers, introduced in the mid-
1960s. Antitrust initiatives pressured IBM to release information to independent maintenance 
providers.  This eventually led to an opening of the system architecture and an ecosystem of 
hardware “clone” makers like Amdahl and Fujitsu as well as software product and service 
companies focused on IBM customers. But IBM had the deepest knowledge of its market. It 
had sold primitive electronic computers since the early 1950s and for decades before that 
dominated in electro-mechanical tabulating machines and other office equipment.  In the 
2000s, this knowledge helped IBM continue to dominate the diminished mainframe market as 
well as do pioneering work in high-performance systems development. But IBM’s role as a 
platform leader changed as enterprise computing evolved to become a much more 
heterogeneous world of machines and software, as well as competitors, of different shapes 
and sizes.  
 By 1980, a few key executives had realized that a platform shift was occurring and they 
introduced their own personal computer design in 1981. The operating system and 
microprocessor turned out to be the two key components of this new PC platform, and IBM 
                                                 
9
 See Gawer and Henderson (2000) and Farrell and Katz (2000) for further discussion on this issue. 
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ceded control over these elements to its supply-chain partners, Microsoft and Intel. So here 
we have a case where a supply-chain platform evolved to become an industry platform but 
under the control of the key suppliers, not the original platform architect and leader. To its 
credit again, though, after absorbing billions of dollars in losses, IBM found a way forward. 
Under new CEO Louis Gerstner, hired from RJR Nabisco in 1993, it became the champion of 
“open systems” (Linux, Java, the Internet, ubiquitous computing, and the cloud).  Gerstner 
and his successors also sold off commodity hardware businesses and rebuilt the company 
around services and middleware software products that help customers utilize different 
platform technologies.   
 The insight here for both managers and researchers is the awareness of how quickly 
platforms can evolve and the leader of one generation lose control over the next.  But we can 
also see that some of the leader’s capabilities may actually transfer to the next generation.  In 
this case, IBM had decades of experience that helped it understand – better than any other 
company – the data-processing needs of enterprise users and other large organizations.  This 
is where the firm kept its focus.  The shift in platforms away from the mainframe and the loss 
of control over the PC were both highly damaging financially.  But these changes created a 
new beginning for a service-oriented IBM.  
 
Google  and Nokia 
 Google’s platform was initially an Internet search engine that became nearly 
ubiquitous on PC desktops with the downloadable and free toolbar. The company then built 
an Internet portal, replete with email, maps, applications, storage, and other features, to 
surround and feed the search engine.  Google monetizes its leadership position by selling 
targeted ads that accompany searches. But Google has not stopped there. The company 
realized years ago that most computing would one day be on mobile devices.  So Google 
bought and then refined the Android operating system (which is based on Linux) and created 
the Chrome browser to facilitate mobile computing as well as mobile searches and advertising.  
Perhaps most important, though, is that Google in 2012 has become the largest smartphone 
OS provider.  But not even Google has done everything right. It was slow to see the 
importance of social networking and has been trying for years (with limited success) to 
challenge Facebook and create a coalition of partners to gain access to more social 
networking and social media content – presumably, to sell more search and advertising.  
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 Google competes fiercely with Apple in the smartphone market, but perhaps the 
company that has lost the most in this competition is Nokia.  (Rim, with Blackberry phone, is 
a close second.) This Finnish company in 2012 remained the largest producer of cell phones, 
and its Symbian software was for a time the dominant software platform for basic handsets.  
However, from 2009-2010, mobile sales were quickly moving to smartphones that required 
more sophisticated software.  Not surprisingly, Nokia saw its market share, market value, and 
financial performance suffer dramatically as Apple’s iPhone handsets, and a variety of 
devices from different companies running Google’s Android software, came to dominate the 
market. Nokia removed its CEO and hired a former Microsoft executive, Steven Elop.  He 
then announced plans to abandon the Symbian operating system as well as another joint OS 
project with Intel.  Instead, he chose to use Microsoft’s Windows phone software for Nokia’s 
next generation of smartphones, a move that may or may not work out for the company.  
 The insight here is that platform leaders must force themselves to think broadly about 
potential competitors from adjacent markets as well as manage the evolution of their 
platforms, business models, and technical or marketing capabilities. Google has always 
focused on search, but computing has been moving beyond the desktop for years and even 
beyond the Internet – to multiple devices as well as applications and content that reside within 
both open (such as the Internet) and closed (such as Facebook) networks.  Moreover, Google 
has challenged the modus operandi of the computer industry – proprietary technology.  Its 
software platform for mobile phones and other devices such as Netbooks and tablets is both 
free and open.  It is hard for companies that charge for their technology and do not have large 
advertising income or other sources of revenue – like Nokia – to beat free and open.  Platform 
leaders must also be prepared to discard their platforms, as IBM did, if that is what survival 
requires. If they fail to develop new technology internally or find suitable acquisitions, then 
they may well find themselves adopting the platform technology of a competitor.   
 
Microsoft versus Apple   
 Steve Ballmer, CEO of Microsoft CEO since Bill Gates handed over the reins in 2000, 
was often criticized for not being able to move much beyond the PC platform.  Indeed, in 
2012, Windows desktop and server and the Office suite still accounted for nearly 80 percent 
of Microsoft’s revenues and almost all its profits. Ballmer was under particular pressure 
because Microsoft’s share price has been stagnant for more than a decade since the end of the 
Internet boom (though this was also true of Intel, Cisco, Nokia, and a host of other high-tech 
17 
 
firms).  Arch-rival Apple, despite the small (but rising) global market share of the Macintosh 
personal computer, and despite its near bankruptcy only a few years ago, has been growing at 
some 50 percent a year and vaulted past Microsoft in market value during 2010.  Apple was 
growing so fast because it had become a major player in consumer electronics as well as 
smartphones, tablets, and digital content as well as software product distribution.   
 On the strength of its high-margin digital service platforms (iTunes, App Store, and 
iCloud), Apple may someday match or surpass Microsoft in margins.  Reproducing digital 
bits is much less costly than reproducing hardware boxes.  But, for the time being, Microsoft 
remained the most profitable of the high-tech giants, including Apple and Google. It has 
survived radically disruptive technological transitions and daunting business-model 
challenges (character-based to graphical computing, the Internet, Software as a Service and 
cloud computing, mobile computing, and social networking). It has survived antitrust scrutiny 
and violations (remember Netscape). Withal, Microsoft continued to “print money,” relying 
on the enormously profitable gross margins of the packaged software business. And change 
has always been in the works at Microsoft, albeit slowly.  Billions of dollars in losses 
(“investment”) from MSN and Bing over some 15 years prepared Microsoft for the online 
world and cloud computing funded by advertising revenue. It learned from the Vista debacle 
in the early 2000s how to break up Windows into smaller, more manageable chunks, which 
can also help deliver new Internet and cloud-based services. The Windows Azure cloud 
offering and SaaS versions of major products have had good receptions in the marketplace 
and appear to be competitive, though not dominant, offerings for the future. Microsoft’s 
decision in early 2011 to buy Skype is also part of an attempt to move beyond the PC and get 
access to new customers as well as better Internet voice and video technology. Other moves 
include Microsoft’s alliance with Nokia to take over its future smartphone software and an 
earlier alliance with RIM to take over the search business on the Blackberry smartphones.   
 The major insight here is how platform leadership can promote wealth or value creation 
as well as constrain innovation. Bill Gates, back in the late 1990s, insisted that Microsoft 
remain a Windows company rather than become a broader platform company and move 
quickly into new technologies and new markets. As a result, Microsoft engineers tried to 
squeeze Windows onto the new platforms, the Internet and then mobile phones, rather than 
create optimized software from scratch and then link the new platforms back to Windows.  
(Microsoft also cut down Windows for the Xbox video game console, but did not retain the 
additional constraint of Windows compatibility.)  Of course, Windows on the desktop is the 
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modern-day equivalent of a gold mine.  It is not hard to understand why Gates and Ballmer 
were reluctant to cannibalize this business. Apple, by contrast, was never wedded to the 
original Macintosh platform, which never caught on at the industry level and failed as a 
business in the 1980s and 1990s anyway. Apple later replaced the core of the Mac OS with 
NeXT software, which was based on UNIX.  But Apple did remain wedded to its unmatched 
capabilities in user interface design and visionary product innovation. Those skills are the 
basis for Apple’s business success with the iPod, iPhone, iTunes, and iPad and its remarkable 
transformation into a global platform leader with multiple integrated devices in several high-
growth markets.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 This paper has discussed some of the major differences between internal and external 
platforms, and suggested how both types of platforms can impact product and service 
innovation. Both kinds of platforms tend to be designed and managed strategically, to further 
the competitive advantage of the platform owner. While internal platforms allow their owner 
to achieve economic gains by re-using or re-deploying assets across families of products 
developed by either the firm or its close suppliers, industry platforms facilitate the generation 
of a potentially very large number of complementary innovations by tapping into the 
innovative capabilities of many external actors, and function as a technological foundation at 
the heart of innovative business ecosystems. Industry platforms guide technological 
innovation trajectories and stimulate innovation on complements.  
 The examples of Intel and other companies suggest there are particular practices that 
effective platform leaders follow (Table 2). Platform leaders who aim to tap into the 
innovative capabilities of an ecosystem of external firms need to develop a vision for their 
platform and promote this among potentially key players in a future ecosystem.  They need to 
build a sufficiently open or modular architecture to facilitate third-party innovation. They 
need to build a vibrant coalition around their platform and carefully manage ecosystem 
relationships that are mutually beneficial for participants. They need to continue evolving the 
platform and the ecosystem to remain competitive as challengers emerge. Overall, the 
effective practice of platform leadership entails a set of internal processes that allow managers 
to make technological decisions on the one hand, and business decisions on the other, in a 
coherent manner – even if they may originate in different part of the organization.  
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 This imperative for coherence creates challenges not only for practitioners, as internal 
divisions of labour lead to organizational silos, but also for scholars – who need to look across 
their own academic silos. For these and other reasons, the phenomenon of industry platforms 
offers a research opportunity to cross-fertilize several disciplines.  In particular, we see three 
sets of platform-related research questions that should help advance our understanding of 
innovation, strategy, organizational behavior and networks, and technological change.  
 
Table 2:  Effective Practices for Platform Leadership 
 
1. Develop a vision of how a product, technology or service could become an essential part of a 
larger business ecosystem 
a. Identify or design an element with platform potential (that is, performing an essential 
function, and easy for others to connect to). 
b. Identify third-party firms that could become complementors to your platform (think 
broadly, possibly in different markets and for different uses)  
2. Build the right technical architecture and ‘connectors’ 
a. Adopt a modular technical architecture, and in particular add connectors or interfaces 
so that other companies can build on the platform 
b. Share the intellectual property of these connectors to reduce complementors’ costs to 
connect to the platform. This should incentivize and facilitate complementary 
innovation. 
3. Build a coalition around the platform: Share the vision and rally complementors into co-creating 
a vibrant ecosystem together  
a. Articulate a set of mutually enhancing business models for different actors in the 
ecosystem 
b. Evangelize the merits and potentialities of the technical architecture 
c. Share risks with complementors 
d. Work (and keep working) on firm’s legitimacy within the ecosystem. Gradually build 
up one’s reputation as a neutral industry broker 
e. Work to develop a collective identity for ecosystem members  
4. Evolve the platform while maintaining a central position and improving the ecosystem’s 
vibrancy 
a. Keep innovating on the core, ensuring that it continues to provide an essential (and 
difficult to replace) function to the overall system, making it worthwhile for others to 
keep connecting to your platform 
b. Make long-term investments in industry coordination activities, whose fruits will 
create value for the whole ecosystem.  
  
  First, we still do not understand very well how industry platforms emerge. The 
economics literature has so far not tackled this question, as researchers tend to assume that the 
platform already exists (as well as its associated markets on each “side” of the platform). The 
literature on technological change and competitive dynamics, and on organizational processes, 
could usefully address the question of platform emergence and ecosystem creation as well. 
The classification of platforms offered in this paper may indicate that under certain conditions 
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there could be an evolution from internal platforms to external platforms, but this hypothesis 
would need to be developed and tested. 
 A related important area of further research is that of the emergence and evolution of 
business ecosystems. The networks approach from the organizational literature (see Brass et 
al, 2004 for a review), by bringing its insights on network dynamics and field evolution 
(Powell et al, 2005) and strategic networks (Gulati et al., 2000; Lorenzoni and Liparinni, 
1999), is well-positioned to make significant contributions in this area. In particular, recent 
work by Nambisan and Sawhney (2011), building on Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006), develops 
explicitly the link between platform leadership and orchestration processes in network-centric 
innovation. The new institutional literature rooted in sociology offer concepts such as 
legitimacy, collective identity, and institutional work, which can be useful to determine 
whether and how platform leaders can successfully establish themselves as trustworthy 
brokers. 
 Third, our understanding of the impact of platforms on innovation and competition still 
needs to be refined. In the literatures we have reviewed (economics, innovation, operations, 
strategy), technological platforms are associated with a positive impact on innovation. The 
positive effect stems from the fact that, by offering unified and easy ways to connect to 
common components and foundational technologies, platform leaders help reduce the cost of 
entry in complementary markets, and provide demand for complements, often fuelled by 
network effects. Platforms offer therefore a setting where it is in the interest of private firms 
to elicit and encourage innovation by others. However, concern over the dominant positions 
that platform leaders such as IBM, Microsoft, Google, or Apple can achieve has raised 
awareness that platforms may have a potentially negative effect on competition and possibly 
on innovation, especially non-incremental innovation. We suggest that as scholars we need to 
further refine our argument about platforms and innovation.  
 For example, further theory development could examine the role of interfaces and 
architecture, and how platform design might focus the attention of innovators onto specific 
trajectories of technological change (Dosi, 1982).  These might take the form of what Nathan 
Rosenberg (1969) called “inducement mechanisms and focusing devices.” It is possible that 
platform leaders tend to successfully stimulate a certain kind of externally-developed 
innovation (that would complement the platform), while aiming to discourage another kind of 
innovation (that would diminish the appeal or the perceived value of the platform). This type 
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of research would highlight the potential trade-offs between innovation on modules or 
discrete products versus innovation on systems.  
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APPENDIX TABLE A.  INTEL COORDINATION INITIATIVES IN 1997-1998 
 
 
IAL Initiative 
Mission Key programs Diffusion 
Networked 
Multimedia 
Make multimedia pervasive on the Net 
and provide the best experience on the 
high-performance Connected PC 
Scalable, MMX Technology 
optimized media engines; Efficient 
media network transports and 
services: tools and services 
H.323 stack in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 4.0; supported by 
firewall vendors; but also products Indeo Video 5.0; and also 
building blocks WDE ships as part of Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer 4.0; RSVP and RTP ship in Windows 98 and Windows 
NT 5.0. 
Manageability Enable platform and network 
infrastructure to make Intel 
Architecture systems the most easily 
manageable and the best managed 
Industry specifications and industry 
groups; software development kits 
Specifications, Software Development Kits; but also products: 
Intel NIC 10  and LanDesk Software products; Also, diffused 
through Microsoft, as ingredients: Wake-on-LAN11
Big Pipes 
 and Wake-on-
Ring NICs and Modems in NT, Win 98. 
Increase content delivery capacity of 
the connected PC to allow home and 
business customers to easily receive 
new broadband digital content 
Common software architecture for 
PC broadband transport; reference 
designs 
Networking connectivity products. 
Security Make PC interaction trustworthy for 
communications, commerce, and 
content 
 
Industry specifications and industry 
groups, drives the CDSA 
standardization effort; software 
development kits 
Open specifications and industry groups, CDSA R2.0, in 
OpenGroup; OpenGroup standard, IBM licensed. Products also: 
IBM and Intel shipping product based on CDSA standard. And 
also, licenses to Zoran: DVD copy protection 
Anywhere-in- 
the-Home 
Unleash the potential of home PCs with 
new uses that deliver computing power 
and content when, where, and how it’s 
is needed in the home. 
PC-friendly protocols and 
standards; concepts demos and 
prototypes. 
Standards, Control-InfraRed – with Hewlett Packard, Microsoft, 
and Sharp; Home- Radio-Frequency – with Compaq, IBM, and 
HP; and Home Device Control.  
Advance-the-
Platform 
Establish the media, communications, 
and interconnect building blocks for the 
next generation high performance Intel 
Architecture platforms 
Interconnects USB, AGP, 1394 A/B; 
future processor optimizations, 
visual PC 2000 
AGP drivers, USB compliance workshops, PC-friendly 1394A 
specifications. No commercialized products. Ingredients in 
Microsoft’s products: Real-time services in WDM in Windows 98 
and Windows NT 5.0. 
Source: Gawer and Henderson (2007) 
                                                 
10 NIC = Network Interface Card, an expansion board (i.e., a printed circuit board) that can be inserted into a computer so the computer can be connected to a network. Most NICs are designed for a 
particular type of network, protocol, and media, although some can serve multiple networks. (Source: www.webopedia.com) 
11 LAN= Local Area Network. A computer network that spans a relatively small area. 
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